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The Puerto affair: revealing the difficulties of the fight against doping 
Bastien Soulé & Ludovic Lestrelin 
Soulé B., Lestrelin L., 2011, « The Puerto Affair: revealing the difficulties of the fight against 
doping », Journal of Sport & Social Issues, vol. 35, n°2, p. 186-208. 
In 1998, the infamous Festina affair revealed how routinely erythropoietin (commonly known 
as EPO) was used by professional cycling teams. Eight years later, another scandal linked to 
doping by cyclists made the headlines after an investigation by the anti-doping section of the 
Spanish Guardia Civil (under the name “Operation Puerto”) led to the identification of a 
network which was taking blood samples of cyclists. Processed in a way that produced an 
artificial concentration of red blood cells, the blood was frozen and then re-injected in the 
cyclists at key moments of the season in order to improve their performance by increasing the 
oxygen supply to the muscles1. Since 2004 the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) has 
banned blood transfusions during or outside competitions (De Mondenard, 2006). Why is this 
more recent affair2 interesting for scientists now that it is such a well known fact that cycling 
and doping go hand in hand (Rabenstein, 1997; Hoberman, 1992)? Beyond the size of the 
																																								 																				
1 Le Monde, 1 June 2006 ; Libération, 16 February 2008. 
2 As explained by Duret and Trabal (2001) scandals are types of shared indignation which generally reinforces 
the position of the federal institution through a mostly internal treatment; affairs, on the contrary, are 
characterized by the intervention of society as a whole (authorities, judges, experts, media as well as public 
opinion). This analysis will demonstrate that talking of a simple scandal would be inappropriate; on the other 
hand, referring to the affair as “Operation Puerto” would be reductive, this term referring only to the police 
action which led to the original identification of the network. This is why, in this article, we will use the term 
“Puerto affair”. 
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network, which in itself was impressive3, and the relative novelty of the process that was 
used, this case reveals the difficulties of the fight against doping of professional cyclists. 
These difficulties, analyzed using a systemic approach, will constitute the core theme of this 
article, of which the Puerto affair is just one example. 
 
1. The chronology of the affair and its protagonists  
 
Following his exclusion from the Kelme team in 2004, Spanish cyclist Manzano divulged the 
doping practices used by this Spanish team in great detail4. These disclosures started a long 
police investigation which led to, among other things, the discovery of an underground 
laboratory located in a Madrid apartment belonging to Dr Fuentes. This is where the blood 
samples were taken and stored. Other ergogenic5 materials were found there as well and 
seized by the Guardia Civil: anabolic steroids, growth hormones, testosterone, thousands of 
doses of EPO, many drugs, about a hundred bags of frozen blood and as many bags of 
plasma. Next to these bags were documents revealing a doping system based on blood 
transfusions, administered to many athletes whose identities could not be immediately 
ascertained due to the use of both numbers and codenames6. Medical equipment necessary for 
sampling, processing, and preserving the blood was also found. And lastly, four months of 
																																								 																				
3 The number of professional athletes which were clients of the network is estimated at about 200 (Le Figaro, 27 
April 2007). 
4 Growth hormones and EPO, blood transfusions, as well as masking of illicit products before and during checks 
(claims published by the Spanish sports daily As, in five consecutive articles, between the 24th and the 29th of 
March 2004). 
5 That is, optimizing human performance (De Leseleuc & Marcellini, 2005). 
6 L’Equipe, 1 July 2006 ; Le Monde, 1 June 2006. 
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phone conversations and videos of the comings and goings at this “laboratory” as well as at 
two other similar sites in Madrid and Saragossa, were recorded. 
 
Five people were arrested on 23 May 2006. Besides Dr Fuentes (former doctor of several 
Spanish teams:  Kelme, Once, etc.), also arrested were: Saiz (then sports manager of the 
Spanish team Liberty Seguros), Labarta (associate sports manager of the team Communidad 
Valenciana), Dr Merinos (hematologist and director of a medical laboratory) and, finally, 
Leon (former mountain biker and Dr Fuentes’ helper). The two doctors were the only ones 
taken into temporary custody, only to be freed after posting a 120,000 euro bail each. 
Based on the judicial report, to which it had early and unauthorized access7, the newspaper El 
Pais of 25 June 2006, reveals that 58 professional cyclists, among whom some top racers 
(Ullrich, Basso, Mancebo, Beloki, Contador and Sevilla) used Dr Fuentes’ “treatments.” 
Several sponsors of teams which had “Puertists” among them (the name given to the cyclists 
suspected of being implicated in the affair) reacted by withdrawing their financial support8. 
Some cyclists and teams were rejected from participating in major events9. Following this 
affair, five professional teams were dissolved and a number of cyclists were forced into early 
																																								 																				
7 Probable consequence of this “leak”: on 30 June 2006, the Guardia Civil officially transmitted the file to the 
Spanish Consejo Superior de Deportes (CSD) as well as to Amaury Sport Organisation (organizer and owner of 
the Tour de France, the beginning of which for 2006 was imminent) and to the Union Cycliste Internationale.  
8 Liberty, an American insurance company, justifies this decision saying: “the implications of Manolo Saiz’s 
detention are highly alarming. They damage our name and cycling’s name” (AFP dispatch, 27 May 2006). No 
fewer than fifteen “Puertists” were on this team. 
9 This was the case for the team Comunidad Valenciana (of which Labarta was a member) and for the cyclists 
Ullrich and Basso for the 2006 Tour de France (Libération, 16 February 2008). 
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retirement (some were fired, and in other cases contracts were not renewed or teams 
disappeared, etc.)10. 
 
On 12 March 2007, Judge Serrano closed the case, arguing that at the time of the affair there 
was no law in Spain punishing doping (a law was subsequently voted, on 2 November 2006) 
and that the danger of the products and the methods used had not been proven11, which 
rendered impossible accusations of “public health hazard” or “endangering the lives of 
others.” The magistrate mentioned that none of the twelve cyclists who gave testimony during 
the procedure had declared receiving blood transfusions. The “Puertists” and the five people 
arrested on 23 May 2006 were thus cleared of charges. 
 
On 14 March 2007, the Madrid prosecutor’s office, representing the Spanish Consejo 
Superior de Deportes12 (CSD), along with the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the 
Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) and the Real Federacion Espagnola de Ciclismo (RFEC) 
appealed this decision, contesting the innocuousness of the methods used by Dr Fuentes. On 
14 February 2008, the Madrid court agreed to resume the procedure, with the goal of 
determining whether Dr Fuentes and his accomplices were abiding by the health rules 
																																								 																				
10 A year after the “operation” 30 “Puertists” had found refuge in Elite 2 (lower division). 
11 In a report written by experts and dated 22 December 2006, the Madrid National Institute of Toxicology 
estimated that the level of EPO found in several bags of blood posed no health risk (El Mundo, 18 February 
2007). Furthermore, Judge Serrano emphasized the scientific uncertainties concerning the side effects of EPO 
use. Lastly he minimized the risks associated with  blood transfusions, particularly with respect to dangers 
involved in other doping methods (As, 11 March 2007). 
12 Spanish Ministry of Sports, the government administration in charge of Sports in Spain. 
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concerning the sampling, storing, preservation and transport of blood13. Not considered a legal 
matter, doping itself is no longer at the core of the debate. In the meantime, the Guardia Civil 
issued at the end of April 2007 a second Puerto file, of some 6,000 pages in length compared 
to the 500 pages of the original version. This list of the “Puertists” is longer, increasing from 
58 to 107 names, and the evidence permitting the identification of the blood contained in the 
bags seized the previous year has significantly increased14. 
 
The discontent caused by the closing of the case was mixed with growing resentment towards 
the judiciary system and even towards the Spanish authorities which were more and more 
openly blamed for not attempting to expose formerly undisclosed practices. The distrust was 
so profound that the Italian National Olympic Committee (INOC) decided to start an 
alternative procedure, announcing in January 2008 its intention to hear the people implicated15 
and indicating the possibility of sanctions16. 
 
On 29 September 2008, Judge Serrano again dismissed the case, arguing the absence of new 
evidence that could lead to prosecution. The prosecutor’s office and the CSD immediately 
filed an appeal17 and, on 12 January 2009, after reviewing the different demands presented, 
the Madrid provincial court decided that there were indeed elements pointing to a public 
																																								 																				
13  El Pais, 15 February 2008. The technique of autotransfusion carries some risk, particularly when the sampling 
is performed in a non-sterile environment or when the blood is not properly preserved. 
14La Gazzetta dello Sport, 30 March 2007. 
15 L’Equipe and Le Figaro, 10 January 2008. Facing the fact that it was impossible to rely on the Spanish 
judiciary system, the INOC will give up (AFP, 26 June 2008). 
16 Starting in August 2007, the new Italian anti-doping regulation allows exclusion from participation in 
competitions of foreign athletes whose doping has been proven. 
17 Libération, 19 November 2008.; L’Equipe, 2 October 2008; As, 4 October 2008. 
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health violation. The reopening of the case was subsequently requested naming the five 
people arrested on 23 May 2006 as well as the three presumed accomplices (Belda, former 
manager of the team Communidad Valenciana; Cordova, former doctor of the team Liberty 
Seguros; Dr Fuentes’ sister, doctor of the team Communidad Valenciana) who could all 
receive up to two years in prison as well as the revocation of their professional license18. 
 
This succession of judiciary decisions, a sign of the conflicting positions of many of the 
protagonists and of the many ways of looking for proof, attests to the challenge of regulating 
doping and to the seemingly erratic nature of the regulation. The following analysis aims at 
supporting and clarifying this observation, in order to bring to light, using this case, the 
various difficulties of the fight against doping, considering the prevention of ergogenic 
methods, the sanctions and the ways to end the crisis. We will thus discuss the factors which 
made it impossible to impede the spreading of doping via auto-transfusion as well as the 
various attempts at restoring a certain balance - apparent or real - among the professional 
cyclist elite. 
 
2.  Prevention and regulation of doping:  a systemic analysis approach 
 
Resorting to the use of drugs or methods designed to enhance performance, or rejecting them, 
could at first glance be considered an independent decision. This is what certain micro- 
economic analyses using game theory claim (Maennig, 2002; Berensten, 2002). The work of 
the psychologist emphasizes the individual factors of vulnerability which predispose one to 
doping behavior (Laure, 2000). Without denying the interest of such approaches, we would 
like to look further at the actors and the methods of the professional cyclist system (PCS). 
																																								 																				
18 El Pais, 15 January and 8 February 2009; La Libre Belgique, 17 January 2009. 
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Several analyses corroborate this conception of doping as a systemic output (Louveau, 
Augustini, Duret, Irlinger & Marcellini, 1995; Brewer, 2002; Stewart & Smith, 2008). The 
relations of power and the dynamics of the political formations within the PCS have been 
extensively studied by Stokvis (2003), whereas Waser (1998) and Salle, Lestrelin & Basson 
(2006) emphasize the study of environmental fluctuations affecting the regulation of doping. 
All these writings are coherent with our position which implies a focus on the network of 
people taking part in the development, the identification, the prevention and/or the repression 
of the doping methods brought to light by the Puerto operation. 
 
Insert here diagram 1 
 
In order to acutely comprehend the structure of a critical situation one has to not only list the 
protagonists (see diagram1) but also study the factors of vulnerability, their relations to each 
other, and the interdependent ties which contributed, in the Puerto affair, to the relative status 
quo mentioned above. Like any complex system, the PCS is source of unknowns and 
unpredictability as it can, through actions or decisions of its members, innovate and organize 
itself in order to adapt to its own changes or to the changes in its environment. The feedback 
loops and circular causality characteristic of the systemic approach make it possible to 
comprehend particularly complex and sometimes counter-intuitive phenomena. For instance, 
when certain decisions have contradictory effects, one can talk of ago-antagonism (Kervern, 
1995): Kayser, Mauron and Miah (2005) claim, for example, that the current way of fighting 
against doping creates as many if not more problems than it prevents. Doping prohibition is 
described as not very efficient, as it possibly encourages the production and use of little 
known drugs which are thus not yet detectable (Caulkins & Reuter, 2005) or even the use of 
masking substances which may be dangerous (Bird & Wagner, 1997; Voy, 1991). A 
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pernicious effect is then generated through the increase of the use of particularly harmful 
products (Stewart & Smith, 2008). Another pernicious effect is found in the fact that cyclists 
resort to self-medication for fear of soliciting medical advice, sometimes using incorrect doses 
(Waddington, 2001). 
Considering all this, the use of the Kervern model (1995) seems heuristically promising.  It 
emphasizes the ambiguous effects of the actions and the decisions taken within a high-risk 
system; besides the ago-antagonism mentioned above, it points to the duplicity of some 
actors19.  Not exclusively producing disorder or stability, these various elements can 
contribute to both, at the end of a complex causal process. This premise requires the 
reconstruction of the “social map” of the actors who influence the vulnerability of a system 
and/or the prevention of the risks that it carries. Once the network has been identified, 
Kervern suggests focusing on five dimensions which structure the functioning of such 
systems in order to facilitate the listing of biases which generate risks and/or crises. 
 
Insert here table 1 
 
Each of these fields supports the actions and decisions within a system. Loopholes can be 
found, due, for example, to a regulation which is inappropriate or badly implemented, or to 
insufficient scientific knowledge. A more thorough study exposes discordance between the 
dimensions or discrepancies between the actors (concerning their objectives, their value 
systems, etc.). All the ambiguities can contribute to the system’s vulnerability, to its 
preventative efficiency as well as to counter-productive effects. The recent use of this model 
																																								 																				
19 For example one can think of the doctor, who is a central figure in the history of doping. Let’s not forget the 
basic ambiguity of sport medicine which aims both at protecting the health of the athletes and at optimizing their 
performance. Concerning the doctors, their many varied positions on doping, and their role in placing sanitary 
and medical perception at the center of regulation, see Salle (2004) and Salle and al. (2006). 
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to study the generalization of doping among professional cyclists (Soule & Bouhaoula, 2008) 
has led to interesting results. First, plural risk factors have been identified by analyzing the 
confrontations between actors within each dimension: heterogeneous levels of knowledge, 
contradictory values, rules established more or less clearly and more or less respected, etc.  
Furthermore, some emerging properties conducive to doping are found at the intersection of 
the dimensions. For example, establishing an official list of prohibited products (rule 
dimension) stimulates the search for alternative methods (knowledge dimension);  the illicit 
nature of doping (rule dimension) associated with the cyclist subculture’s code of silence 
(value dimension) leads to underestimating the scope of the problem (fact dimension); this 
affects the epidemiological knowledge of the effects of the products, which remains partial 
(knowledge dimension); finally the concern of preserving the image of cycling competition 
(goal dimension) drives some sports institutions to cover up ascertained doping. Furthermore, 
frequent procedural irregularities and long judicial delays, resulting in rare sanctions, diminish 
the credibility of available deterrents (rule dimension). This type of analysis leads to the 
conclusion that an understanding of the doping system requires the identification of complex 
interactions between factors which are not connected a priori. Our hypothesis is that it is valid 
to use a similar approach, based not only on the vulnerability of the PCS concerning doping, 
but more widely on the problematic nature of its prevention and regulation, demonstrated 
since operation Puerto. 
 
3. Method 
 
Like other deviant and/or illicit practices, doping evades factual analysis. Hence the limited 
production of data renders necessary a secondary exploitation of media and legal sources. 
Thus, we proceeded to analyze systematically articles published by the international press on 
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the subject of the Puerto affair20, during a time period starting with the original revelations of 
Manzano (April 2004) and ending with the second re-opening of the case by the Spanish 
justice system (early summer 2009).  Using this moment as the end of the period covered 
allows us not to chase after new media developments, which would be incompatible with the 
rhythm of research (Marchetti, 2002). Thus, it is clear that this article does not account for the 
entirety of this affair which is characterized by its many ramifications, several reversals of 
situation and the persistence of shady areas. An exhaustive description is hardly compatible 
with the format of a research paper. More circumscribed, our objective required the selection 
and interpretation, within the constituted corpus, of factual elements revealing the erratic 
character of the international governance of doping. 
 
Among the material collected during this five-year analysis of the press, 60 articles taken 
from 18 European newspapers are used directly. L’Equipe, Le Monde, As, El Pais, Le Nouvel 
Observateur and Libération have been the most sollicited. Le Figaro has been used 
occasionally as well as Le Parisien, La Gazzetta dello Sport, L’Humanité, Marca, La Tribune, 
Le Temps, Le Soir, El Mundo, Le Journal Du Dimanche, La Libre Belgique and Der Spiegel. 
Finally, four press agency dispatches and one internet source were used. 
 
The qualitative data collected (judicial rulings, commentaries of judicial reports, journalistic 
analyses, interviews and opinions of the protagonists) have been exploited using the Kervern 
model. It is worth noting that, contrary to Delmas and Fleuriel’s observations (2002) 
concerning the way the media covers doping affairs, the articles published by the press show a 
																																								 																				
20 Three databases were exploited:  the daily press review of the Mission Interministérielle de Lutte contre les 
Drogues et la Toxicomanie; the thematic files constituted and published on line on two very well-documented 
sites (www.cyclisme.dopage.com and www.cyclingnews.com). The collection of data was completed by the 
documentary analysis made by M. Laville in his Masters Degree thesis (University of Caen-Normandy, 2008). 
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certain critical distancing relative to the official sources and the institutional handling of this 
affair. Some journalists, anxious to counter these interpretations, clearly blamed the actions of 
the institutions through thorough investigations which facilitated our own approach to the 
facts and decisions. 
 
4. Results 
 
The difficulties of the fight against doping revealed by the Puerto affair are presented below 
in reference to each of the five dimensions of the Kervern model (1995). This is followed by a 
synthesis presented in the form of a diagram showing the relations between the identified 
factors of vulnerability and crisis. 
 
4.1 The fact dimension 
 
Two aspects will be treated in the first part of the results: first, a group of facts, all dated prior 
to 2006, which shows the spread and even a tacit tolerance for doping among professionals, 
particularly doping through autotransfusion; secondly, elements helping to conceal the 
disclosed practices and/or to minimize the scope of the network exposed by the raid of the 
Spanish Guardia Civil, such as hindering the production of or retaining judicial information, 
selectively revealing the identities of the athletes implicated in the affair, etc. 
 
Perfected in the 1970s, doping through transfusion was more or less abandoned at the 
beginning of the 1990s in favor of EPO which has similar effects but requires less elaborate 
medical logistics. Since 2000, this ergogenic process has made a comeback, which can be 
explained by progress made in the detection of EPO (see below, the knowledge dimension). 
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The extent of the problem is such that several doping specialists have expressed their concern:  
D’Ottavio, a member of the antidoping commission of the Italian Health Ministry, declared as 
early as 2003 that transfusion was one of the methods most used by cyclists21.  Two days after 
the operation, the UCI stated that it had on several occasions informed the Spanish 
government and the WADA of its suspicions concerning the use of blood doping in Spain, 
thus requesting support in the investigations. Therefore, the type of doping “exposed” by the 
Puerto operation had already been used for a long time within the PCS. Furthermore, the 
actors involved had long been under suspicion. For example, the president of the RFEC 
declared on 28 June 2006 that he had always had doubts concerning Saiz and Fuentes22. More 
generally, it was the alarming spread of doping in Spain, due to a lax response officially 
recognized by the Zapatero government, which led to the implementation of a “zero 
tolerance” policy23 at the beginning of 2005, resulting in the 2006 law which severely 
punishes these practices. From this angle, the Puerto affair is the result of a tacit tolerance for 
doping in Spain. Indeed doping, including transfusion doping, had long been performed by 
professional cyclists with the knowledge of several institutional actors which were supposed 
to prevent and punish such practices. 
 
Another essential aspect emerges from operation Puerto:  the difficulties and reticence 
encountered when gathering and producing information pertaining to the affair, as well as 
partial, selective and slow communication of the tangible elements contained in the files. As a 
consequence, evidence became scarce, rendering punishment difficult (see below, the rule 
																																								 																				
21 Le Monde, 24 July 2003. In September 2004, the American rider Hamilton was suspended for two years for 
transfusion doping. He was already a “patient” of Dr Fuentes. 
22 “We heard rumors […] The police operation was necessary. We made mistakes in our fight against doping in 
Spain. Our duty was to investigate these frauds” (Associated Press dispatch of 28 June 2008). 
23 Libération, 17 February 2005. 
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dimension). This is all the more surprising considering how substantial the seizures made by 
the Guardia Civil were, as was the gathering of phone conversations, photographs and video 
recordings by the investigators. Several signs point to hindrances situated at the intersections 
of judicial constraints and diverse strategies (see below, the objective dimension). 
 
The State prosecutor deplored, for example, the fact that Judge Serrano had not made use of 
the data available on the computers seized by the Guardia Civil. We also know from a 
journalistic24 source that Dr Fuentes kept information concerning his “patients” in files in his 
Canary island residence. This residence was not searched, even though the judicial authorities 
could have easily done so. Consequently, the arrest of Dr Fuentes led to the identification of 
only a part of his “client records”25. 
 
Moreover the hundred bags of blood were not all analyzed. Only eight bags were tested for 
EPO, all of which tested positive. None of the others were tested: the Barcelona antidoping 
laboratory in charge of the testing actually suspended its work because it had not been paid 
for the tests it had already done26. Lastly, the judge interviewed only 12 of the 58 first 
“Puertists”, arguing that none of them had complained about health problems. 
																																								 																				
24 Le Monde, 24 March 2007. 
25 These decisions were interpreted as a sorting of information with the goal of not publicizing the implication of 
other athletes (Le Monde, 7 December 2006).  This article says that several Spanish football teams (including 
Real Madrid and FC Barcelona) were linked to Dr Fuentes. This claim caused the newspaper to be fined 300,000 
euros following a complaint filed by Real Madrid. Le Journal du Dimanche of 2 February 2006 implicates tennis 
player Rafael Nadal as well as football payers. 
26 Le Monde, 7 December 2006. Continuing the testing ordered by the judge to identify the origin of the blood 
and detect traces of products is costly. The laboratory in charge of the testing stated that it would resume 
working only if it was paid the 25,000 dollars it was owed (El Pais, 16 January 2007). 
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Besides this minimal production of information concerning the affair and its protagonists, the 
transmission of elements of the case to the varied sport authorities susceptible to issue 
sanctions was also problematic. A month after the operation, at an antidoping convention 
taking place in Paris, the President of the UCI expressed his doubts about the willingness of 
the Spanish authorities to cooperate. At the end of 2006 he officially deplored the lack of 
cooperation of the Spanish justice system27 which had refused to send him the information 
contained in the files. Judge Serrano had then argued that it was not possible to authorize the 
use of these documents as a basis for sport sanctions. On 23 April 2007, the UCI - through its 
president - the WADA and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) reacted by urgently 
appealing to the Spanish Minister of Sport and asking that the Puerto affair be thoroughly 
investigated28. The request remained unheard. Almost three years after the beginning of the 
operation, the WADA president tried again to pressure the Madrid court into handing over the 
evidence collected during the investigation29. At the same time, in May 2009, the RFEC, 
prompted into action by the CSD30, tried to get access to the records. The request was denied 
by the judge who argued that there was no element indicating a public health violation.  
 
These very timid attempts at gathering information, combined with the fact that the 
institutions in charge did not share data, prevent a full exposure of the affair or the 
punishment of its actors. As a result, the scope of the network is minimized and its structure 
remains unclear. The new antidoping legal framework introduced in Spain at the end of 2006 
should permit a better understanding and clarification of the facts. It is a sign of recent 
																																								 																				
27 In a letter addressed to the Spanish Ministry of Sport (Eurosport, 26 June 2007). 
28 Le Parisien, 24 April 2007. 
29 Le Nouvel Observateur, 28 February 2009. 
30 L’Equipe, 24 February 2009. 
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eagerness on the part of the Spanish authorities, which is also apparent in the actions taken to 
identify and punish fans who cause trouble during sporting events31. 
 
4.2 The knowledge dimension 
 
The progress in scientific knowledge and the fine-tuning of antidoping tests produce a mix of 
opportunities and constraints for the PCS. Since 2000, progress in testing has rendered EPO 
detectable, leading the athletes to turn to autotransfusion, an equally performance-enhancing 
method which is undetectable32 (de Mondenard, 2006). The fact that detection is so difficult is 
probably the reason why the network exposed by the Puerto operation became so vast. That 
the evidence was discovered by the police shows how impotent the antidoping institutions 
were. 
 
Current scientific knowledge allows a comparison between the bags of blood seized by the 
Guardia Civil and the deoxyribinucleic acid (DNA) of the riders under suspicion. This would 
confirm their involvement or clear them with almost no risk of error. However only two such 
comparisons have been performed: one, requested by the German judicial authorities, led to 
the conviction of Ullrich (see below, the rule dimension); the other, performed by the INOC, 
shows that Valverde, who had ranked number one in the UCI Pro Tour in 2006 and 2008, had 
																																								 																				
31 Concerning racism and violence during sporting events, all the convictions are now systematically recorded in 
a central file. This document is managed by the Interior Ministry. It also keeps record of all the incidents 
affecting sporting competitions (place, date, type of offence, name of club and/or individual, sanction) (Salle, 
2008). 
32 Autotransfusion can be indirectly indicated by the number of red cells in the blood. However it is still 
impossible to know precisely the method used to cause such a high hematocrit level:  EPO, long-term exposure 
at high altitude, hyperbaric chamber, blood transfusion, etc. 
16 
	
used Dr Fuentes’s services33. It is worth noting that all the “Puertists” who were asked to 
submit to similar comparisons to prove their innocence refused to do so, giving various 
reasons (see below, the rule dimension and the value dimension). It is only under coercion or 
during later antidoping tests, that their blood was taken and the DNA testing performed. 
However several factors, which will be analyzed later, prevent the use of scientific methods 
which would ascertain that the blood seized in Dr Fuentes’s Madrid apartment belongs to the 
suspected cyclists. 
 
4.3 The objective dimension 
 
In this section we will address the teleological priorities of several of the protagonists, 
particularly insofar as these priorities generate strategies preventing the identification of the 
network of the athletes involved and/or the issuing of various sanctions.   
 
Following the revelations of May 2006 several teams terminated their riders’ contracts and 
expressed their condemnation of the more indulgent team managers. But others took 
advantage of the opportunity created by these dismissals to hire recently sacked “Puertists” at 
a lower cost. This situation, resulting from an intense competition between the professional 
teams, on both sport and economic levels, is one of the endogenous factors which made the 
PCS remain conducive to doping. Indeed, expelling riders is not a very efficient deterrent 
when their performance level makes them attractive to other less discriminating teams. 
Moreover this opportunistic way of operating contributes to keeping the composition of the 
PCS unchanged, including the drug-using riders. 
 
																																								 																				
33 Le Nouvel Observateur, 1 April 2009 ; L’Equipe, 24 February 2009. 
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Another reason why this affair is important is that it involves a large number of cyclists. 
Paradoxically, this may explain why the sanctions were so light: greater severity would have 
led to the exclusion of a large number of riders, including many Spanish star riders. Beyond 
that, a change of perspective is necessary to understand the stakes outside of the PCS. The list 
of the tennis players and professional football players who used the services of Dr Fuentes 
was never released (see above, the fact dimension). The cyclists were the only “Puertists” 
whose identities were exposed by the press and the only ones - some of them - who faced 
prosecution and/or sanctions. 
 
The lack of cooperation of the Spanish judicial system, despite multiple and repeated requests, 
puts into question its willingness to facilitate the gathering of evidence and the investigation 
of the case (see below, the rule dimension). Pat McQuaid (president of the UCI) suggested on 
several occasions that the Spanish authorities were trying to hide something34. Besides, the 
petition for nullity filed by the State prosecutor on 22 March 2007 stipulates that the closing 
of the case was “precipitated and surprising”35. Is the goal to minimize the real scope of this 
embarrassing affair? Is it to protect Spanish top-level sport teams which are doing very well at 
the end of the 2000’s36? The emphatic though rather hasty assertions made by eminent 
																																								 																				
34 Le Temps, 26 February 2008. 
35 Le Monde, 24 March 2007. 
36 Jaime Lissavetsky, Secretary of State and president of the CSD, called 2008 “a magical year for Spanish 
sport”: international titles were won in cycling (Tours of France, Italy and Spain, Olympic games), tennis (Davis 
Cup, Wimbledon and Olympic games) and football (European Championship). The head of the government, Jose 
Luis Zapatero said: “We are among the best countries in the world. Thanks to your success, it is easy to belong 
to the G8 of sport” (El Pais, 23 November 2008). 
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representatives of the authorities, trying to minimize the scope of the network of athletes 
linked to Dr Fuentes37, reinforce the plausibility of this explanation. 
 
A more direct antidoping expert explains that “when it comes to doping, Spain is the most 
problematic European country”38. According to the presidents of the UCI and the RFEC, 
“Spain is a doping paradise”39. This is confirmed by the doctor of a professional team who 
said: “it is generally admitted, except by the Spanish authorities, that Spain is the hub of 
European doping for every sport”40. Even the Tour of Spain organizers stated that they were 
frustrated by the little progress made by the Spanish authorities in the Puerto affair, 
particularly when compared to the more radical actions taken against the “Puertists” in other 
countries41. The director of this race emphasized that in Germany or in Italy the cyclists who 
were suspected of involvement were under a lot more pressure, whereas in Spain the 
presumption of innocence allowed the cyclists to enjoy relative clemency42. This situation is 
all the more surprising, as Spain is one of the European countries where the state plays a 
major role and the management of sport is centralized on the grounds that the promotion and 
development of sport are considered a public service (Miege, 2000)43. 
																																								 																				
37 On 4 July 2006, Jaime Lissavetsky tried to be reassuring: “None of the football players or tennis players are 
involved” (Libération, 7 December 2006). Aimed at stopping claims that top-level Spanish football and tennis 
players were clients of Dr Fuentes, this denial was nevertheless contested by Dr Fuentes the next day. 
38 Le Temps, 26 February 2008 (the informant wanted to remain anonymous). 
39 Libération, 16 February 2008. The day after the Puerto operation the president of the RFEC declared that the 
antidoping bill would lead to the disappearance of the Spanish “doping paradise”. 
40 Gerard Guillaume, doctor of the French team La Française des Jeux (L’Humanité, 19 July 2008). 
41 Reuters dispatch, 10 May 2007. 
42 As, 10 May 2007. 
43 Title 8 of the law of 15 October 1990 stipulates that “the CSD is in charge of implementing all the measures 
concerning the prevention, control and repression of doping” (Miege, 2000, p. 71). An ordinance from 1996 
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4.4 The rule dimension 
 
The Puerto affair, like the Festina affair eight years earlier, did not start with a positive anti-
doping test. The government took charge, using police enforcement and the law, thus 
replacing the sport authorities with common justice (Basson, 2001). However, more than three 
years after the seizures of the Puerto operation, it is obvious that using the judicial system 
only had a moderate impact. 
 
To this day the Spanish justice system has not allowed any sport organization to use elements 
contained in the files as a basis for sport sanctions, thus rendering the suspected riders and 
managers almost untouchable44. Only four riders were suspended by the Italian Cycling 
Federation (ICF), after admitting their guilt to the INOC45: Basso (for 2 years) and Scarponi 
(for 18 months); Valverde, banned from racing in Italy for two years46; Jaschke, suspended 
for a year by the Austrian Cycling Federation, also after admitting guilt47. 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
states the procedures through which the laboratories are approved and controlled; a decree of the same year 
establishes sanctions; and a resolution of the CSD dated 11 February 1997 lists the methods and products which 
are prohibited. Contrary to the law voted in November 2006, this law did not make provisions for legal sanctions 
and did not address the case of the dealers. 
44 Thus “cleared”, the “Puertists” were able to get another license and, for some, to find another team. However 
the UCI expressed its discontent over having to give his Pro Tour license back to Manolo Saiz. 
45 Concerning Basso, the INOC threatened him with DNA testing which was possible after 1) it had obtained 
blood samples from a Barcelona laboratory in charge of testing; 2) it had taken a blood sample from Basso 
during a antidoping spot-check. The winner of the 2006 Tour of Italy and 2005 Tour de France challenger of 
Armstrong then admitted his guilt. Scarponi did the same shortly after. 
46 L’Equipe, 14 May 2009. Heavy with consequence, this ban kept Valverde from participating in the 2009 Tour 
de France, the 16th leg of which taking place in the Aosta Valley in Italy (Le Figaro, 18 May 2009; Le Monde, 15 
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Spanish law is not very suitable for sanctions taken by the justice system either; indeed one of 
the obstacles in the identification of the “cheaters” is the necessity to find a criminal context 
in which to organize the search for evidence. If it is exaggerated to claim that this context did 
not exist in Spain at the time of the affair (see above), the production, use and distribution of 
doping products only became punishable by law (with sentences as high as 2 years in prison) 
after the fact, in November 2006. Because the laws are not retroactive, the facts and practices 
recorded by the Guardia Civil cannot be punished under this new law. Consequently it is 
legally impossible to initiate a procedure of identification of the blood bags through DNA 
analysis with the aim of legal sanctions. 
 
A digression is necessary to explain the specific procedure which allowed the exposure of 
Ullrich after a DNA test. Because at the time there was no antidoping law in Germany, the 
German justice system used an alternative approach to demonstrate that Ullrich was guilty, 
charging him with fraud and cheating the public, the sponsors and his teammates. The rider 
had actually used doping methods although he had signed, with his team T-Mobile, a 
document stating that he would not use prohibited products. Thus he had received salaries 
which would not have been paid had his employer known about his doping. This legal 
concept had never yet been applied in a case of suspected doping48. Following the DNA test 
which proved the German rider’s guilt (his blood was found in nine of the bags seized in Dr 
Fuentes’s laboratory) the Bonn prosecutor’s office offered him a deal: he would admit his 
guilt and pay 250,000 euros to various charities and to the public treasury, and in exchange 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
June 2009). The Spanish cyclist appealed this sanction to the CAS, but the decision was not handed before the 
beginning of the Tour de France (Le Monde, 23 June 2009). 
47 La Tribune, 19 September 2007;  Le Monde, 28 July 2007; Der Spiegel, 30 June 2007. 
48 Le Nouvel Observateur, 10 March 2008. 
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the investigation would be terminated and the case closed. The cyclist paid, the procedure was 
dropped and, because of this agreement, Ullrich is no longer considered guilty of a felony. 
 
Other procedural possibilities were explored: in Spain, public endangerment and public health 
violations were successively invoked as a basis for prosecution but could not lead to the 
designation of culprits because evidence of harmful effects on the health of the cyclists has 
not been demonstrated. Even though blood transfusions are recognized as dangerous and it 
has been proven that several cyclists have used this doping method49, it is difficult to show 
that a person has been exposed to a risk as long as this person is healthy, as is the case for the 
“Puertists”. More than three years after the operation, the judicial soap opera is still running. 
The second reopening of the case mentioned at the beginning of the article is motivated by 
two presumptions of penal code violations50: did Dr Fuentes and his network respect the legal 
rules concerning the conditioning of medication (uninterrupted cold chain for the blood bags; 
conditions of preservation of products like EPO)? Were the medical procedures (taking and/or 
injecting blood) performed by licensed practitioners? Doping is no longer at the center of the 
legal battle. The consequence of the fact that alternative approaches are being used is that 
only doctors are now under investigation, the riders and sport managers being called as simple 
witnesses if necessary. 
 
One last aspect concerning the rule dimension has to be mentioned. Many organizations could 
a priori control violations, issue sanctions, and/or pronounce arbitration: the UCI, national 
federations, the WADA, the CAS (Court of arbitration for Sport), judicial institutions of every 
																																								 																				
49 Several newspapers published excerpts from the report by Judge Serrano stating on 12 March 2007 that 
although he was convinced that the cyclists had used autotransfusion for doping purposes, the evidence was not 
sufficient to constitute a public health violation. 
50 Libération, 16 February 2008. 
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country, Ministries or State Secretaries of sport, national Olympic Committees, the IOC, etc.51 
This situation has several consequences: the variety of goals and the diverging priorities but 
also the contradictions, and even judicial incompatibilities, which can lead to the dilution of 
responsibilities, to the blocking of situations and, incidentally, to long delays between 
respective procedures52. For example, the UCI, swift in its denunciation of the lack of 
cooperation of the Spanish justice system and authorities, claimed that it was impossible to 
hand in the blood samples it possessed for the purpose of DNA analysis. The samples are 
scientifically tested and the UCI rules forbid their transmission for other use53. 
 
The competition between these various legal frameworks allows protagonists to play with the 
rules in a way that is revealing of their strategies. The hesitations surrounding the case of 
Valverde, a Spanish cyclist, are very telling. On 29 August 2007, based on the information 
exposed in the second Puerto file, the UCI barred him from participating in the World 
Championship. On 7 September, the RFEC refused to take any disciplinary measure against 
Valverde, announcing its intention to select him. The Spanish Secretary of Sport expressed 
support for the rider, emphasizing the lack of new elements proving his involvement in Dr 
Fuentes’s network. This stand taken by the Spanish government led to a letter from the 
president of the UCI to the Secretary of Sport, pointing to damning evidence of Valverde’s 
guilt and deploring the lack of transparency shown by the Spanish government. 
																																								 																				
51 Moreover 12 of the 17 autonomous Spanish communities have jurisdiction and their own laws governing 
sport. The CSD is supposed to coordinate their action, particularly concerning top-level sport, the fight against 
doping or violence (Miege, 2000). 
52 For example, the RFEC waited for official notification of the case being closed before it reacted: “ when we 
get it, we will make a decision. It will depend on what has been decided by the prosecution which can appeal the 
decision of the judge” (Libération, 13 March 2007). 
53 Associated Press dispatch, 10 August 2006 
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The CAS, arguing that it did not have sufficient elements to bar Valverde from racing, 
allowed him to participate in the World Championship54. The WADA and the UCI 
unsuccessfully requested from the Spanish judge access to a blood bag labeled with a code 
supposedly designating Valverde in order to perform a DNA test. The pouch was then 
requested by the CAS but the request was denied by Judge Serrano, arguing that the “private 
organization” status of the CAS rendered impossible the transmission of evidence. This denial 
led, on 11 July 2008, to the UCI and the WADA jointly filing an appeal to implement the 
decision of the CAS. In July 2008, the CAS gave the Spanish justice system six months to 
hand over the blood bag55. 
 
Valverde is also at the center of another imbroglio. Taking advantage of a brief moment when 
the 2008 Tour de France was going through Italy, the INOC gave Valverde a blood test. A 
DNA comparison of that blood with a blood sample seized during the Puerto operation 
allowed the INOC to confirm that the latter belonged to Valverde. Supported by the UCI, the 
antidoping court of the INOC then pronounced the sanction mentioned above for the violation 
of the WADA code. 
 
The Spanish cyclist filed a complaint, arguing that the INOC had not respected the prohibition 
from using elements of the Puerto files that had been issued by the Spanish justice system56. 
His team (Caisse d’Epargne) accused the INOC of being incompetent and characterized the 
procedure as irregular. The Madrid Superior Court declared invalid the procedure used by the 
																																								 																				
54 The decision of the CAS (2007/O/1381 RFEC & Valverde c/ UCI) can be consulted on its website. 
55 Marca, 14 April 2008; L’Equipe, 11 July 2008. 
56 Le Nouvel Observateur, 6 May 2009. 
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INOC for gathering evidence, arguing 1) that because it was not a representative of the Italian 
justice system, the INOC did not have the right to request from Spain blood samples 
susceptible to establish Valverde’s guilt57 ; and 2) that the evidence gathered during the 
Spanish investigation could not be used in another affair58. The president of the Spanish 
Olympic Committee also asserted the innocence of Valverde. The RFEC completed this front 
of support for Valverde, arguing that it is “the only organization allowed to impose 
disciplinary sanctions in doping cases”59. Finally there was nearly a diplomatic incident when 
the Spanish Secretary of Sport declared that it was the responsibility of the Spanish Justice 
system to judge this Spanish citizen. 
 
According to the INOC antidoping prosecutor, Valverde’s lawyers present at his hearing did 
not respond to the accusations, claiming only that the Italian authorities did not have the 
legitimacy to act in this affair. This is not “playing by the rules” based on the existence, 
absence, and/or pertinence of factual evidence, but rather “playing with the rules” (Boudon & 
Bourricaud, 1982), with a focus on the legitimacy of the actors, the legal framework and the 
procedures, aimed in fine at reducing - or even at preventing - the judicial and/or disciplinary 
sanctions against this rider. 
 
It is easy to perceive the limits of a regulating system confronted with difficulties in 
characterizing the behaviors it is supposed to punish, with diverse legal and regulatory 
frameworks, and which, on top of everything, is subject to an unwilling judicial authority. 
 
																																								 																				
57 L’Equipe, 18 February 2009. 
58 Le Nouvel Observateur, 1 April 2009. 
59 Le Figaro, 18 May 2009. 
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4.5 The value dimension 
 
Some solemn agreements foreboding self-regulating capacities in the PCS had no effect. For 
example, the ethical code proposed by the UCI and signed by all the Pro Tour teams in the 
immediate aftermath of the first revelations of May 2006 consisted of a moral commitment to 
fire anybody convicted of doping, to temporarily bar from competition all the riders under 
investigation and not to hire any rider before a ruling had been issued by a judge60. Faced with 
hiring opportunities, several teams paid no heed to this agreement, as attested by the contracts 
signed by many “Puertists” between 2006 and 2008 (see above, the objective dimension)61. 
The dissonance between the axiomatic dimension and the teleological one is striking. 
 
Moreover, the other athletes a priori involved in the Puerto affair are not negligible:  football 
players from FC Barcelona, Real Madrid and FC Valencia, top tennis players, etc. These 
athletes were revered as long as they made Spain a leading nation in sport in the 2000’s:  
“The problem is that in Spain gods are untouchable! […] In Italy they do the right thing […] 
if they have to accuse Basso, they do it. Here, if a champion is implicated, we cover up for 
him”62. 
 
Finally, beyond the commitments which were not honored and the special status attributed to 
some athletes, hiding behind grand principles permits a justification - sincere or cynical - of 
certain actions or attitudes. For example, one can, like Dr Fuentes, invoke medical ethics to 
																																								 																				
60 This last point was approved by the members of the AIGCP (Association Internationale des Groupes Cyclistes 
Professionnels), through a verbal commitment, in October 2006. 
61 The opportunities were all the more attractive because this hiring took place in an imbalanced context, the 
teams offering most of the “Puertists” salaries lower than what their sport ranking allowed them to aspire to. 
62 Comments made by former rider Manzano (Le Monde, 11 December 2006). 
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justify doping in athletes who were in the past allegedly endangered not by ergogenic 
practices but by the inhuman sport challenges that are imposed on them63. More frequently, 
some principles are used to hinder a thorough control of the professional activities of the 
athletes: presumption of innocence, protection of privacy, mention of their status as ordinary 
citizens and religious considerations are, for example, used to justify their refusal to submit to 
blood testing. Thus Ullrich justified his refusal to submit to a DNA test declaring that he is “a 
professional cyclist and not a murderer or a criminal”. Massimo Martelli, Basso’s attorney, 
declared on 5 September 2006, following an appeal by McQuaid for the “Puertists” to provide 
a blood sample for DNA testing purposes, that his client would never submit to a DNA test 
which would constitute an unnecessary and inappropriate intrusion into his private life. 
 
5.  Synthesis and discussion 
 
The structure of this article may lead to the idea that the model chosen was essentially used to 
characterize the various elements preventing an efficient regulation of doping. However the 
model’s contribution is not limited to this purpose. We first tried to reveal the blockages 
stemming from confrontations within each dimension. Diagram 2 illustrates and synthesizes 
this approach, focusing on the factors of the increase of doping through autotransfusion in 
professional cycling. 
 
Insert here diagram 2 
 
																																								 																				
63 “Whether the drug used to protect them is listed as a doping product is of secondary importance” (Le Monde, 
2 September 2006). 
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Moreover, emerging properties (linked to mutual reinforcement between factors, cause and 
effect relations, etc.) adverse to the fight against blood doping appear at the intersection of the 
dimensions. The diagram below (diagram 3) presents a simplified version of some of these 
interactions, focusing this time on the difficulties encountered after operation Puerto. The 
effects are in bold. 
 
Insert here diagram 3 
 
Without overestimating its interest, it is worth noting that the Kervern model, as it is used 
here, allows us to connect more easily the available information relating to the Puerto affair 
while contributing to the partial disclosure of the way the PCS handles doping64. In this sense, 
it is systemic: the analysis, by making possible the identification of elaborate causal links, 
leads to the emergence of new properties within the system. Indeed, understanding the doping 
mechanism requires a comprehension of the interactions existing between factors which are a 
priori insignificant and unconnected and of the decisions made at different times and 
involving actors belonging to various organizations. The exposed contradictions, 
characteristic of a complex social system, result in slow procedures, giving a reprieve to the 
actors involved, a majority of whom are still active within the PCS. The judicial and sport 
authorities do not work within the same timeframe. 
 
It would be tempting to suggest an international breakdown of the governance of doping in 
relation to Puerto affair. In fact this affair reveals failures in the way problems inherent to 
																																								 																				
64 Each modelization is a specific look at reality; it is not aimed at being exhaustive - which would be illusory - 
but it must account for the properties and relations considered essential and pertinent. Thus a compromise has to 
be found between a reductive simplification and an exhaustive perfectionism: regardless of the efforts, “the real 
mistake would be to think that everything is understood” (Le Moigne, 1990). 
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sport are managed, and it illustrates the necessity of outside regulatory intervention. Hence 
governance is taken in its systemic acceptation, its purpose being to account for the 
interdependence and the necessary inter-organization regulations in a complex situation: 
doubts concerning the environment, multiple actors serving diverging interests (public, 
associative, commercial) and multiple levels of coordination (Bayle & Chantelat, 2007). The 
Puerto affair shows that it is necessary to switch from a vertical and centralized regulation to a 
horizontal coordination, favoring the notions of network, compromise and shared power 
(Bayle & Chantelat, 2007). Governance then refers to the coordination problems stemming 
from the diversity of actors, scenes and forms of interaction (Lascoume & Le Gales, 2007) 
which creates “disorder” (Gaudin, 2002).  
 
Several elements also motivate the use of the term “crisis”: the large and increasing number of 
protagonists; the existence of heated controversies exacerbated by conflicting interests; the 
spectacular coverage of the affair by the media; the weakening of the legitimacy of key actors 
of the PCS and of the fight against doping65. Moreover, the difficulty experienced when 
attempting to understand the affair in all its dimensions and the discordant cohabitation of the 
judiciary, government and sport actors also point to calling this affair a crisis. Finally, beyond 
the blurring of roles and the weakening of the organizational structure, which according to 
Weick (1993) characterize a crisis situation, the antidote constituted by the urgent 
organization of networks of actors (Kervern, 1995) was not very efficient, thus accentuating 
the impression that there was no governance. 
 
																																								 																				
65 It is undeniable that the WADA did not play its role of coordination of the various legal and sport antidoping 
mechanisms. 
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However, crisis contexts, by definition limited in time, generally come with attempts to 
restore the original order. Is this desirable, even though this case shows a lack of stability of 
the initial order, a limited resilience of the actors and even a certain degree of duplicity on the 
part of some protagonists? Rather than qualifying the present situation as a crisis of 
governance, an appealing but inappropriate expression, it is preferable to say that it is the 
gradual and belated establishment of a European - and maybe worldwide - governance of 
doping. While erratic and the object of numerous difficulties and oppositions, the governance 
of doping has been put on the political agenda, thus making it possible to envision the “crisis” 
as an opportune moment to hasten change, to clarify the responsibilities and rights of each 
protagonist and to reorganize the international regulation of doping. 
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Diagram 1:  the main protagonists of the Puerto affair 
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Table 1:  the five dimensions of the Kervern model (1995) 
 
Dimensions Description Each actor of the PCS 
1. Teleological 
(objectives, 
interests) 
The goals of the actors, 
inevitably contradictory, lead to 
conflicts of interest 
-  Pursues goals which can converge 
or diverge from the strategies of 
other actors66 
2. Statistical  
(facts, data) 
Conscience and memorization of 
accidental facts and past 
incidents 
-  Knows more or less the data 
concerning doping and current 
practices 
-  Sometimes collects and stores 
information 
3. Epistemic 
(knowledge,  
Diverse forms of knowledge, 
emanating from various sources, 
- Possesses and/or produces 
empirical or scientific knowledge 
																																								 																				
66 The organizations which manage the risks generally consider safety, a public issue, an absolute priority.  
Beyond the discourse, safety goals are varied (Amalberti, 2002) and particular interests sometimes supersede the 
safety goals (Thoenig, 1994). 
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models) of the high-risk phenomenon  
Allows a risk model. 
(physiological, chemical, etc.) on 
doping, its effects, its detection, etc. 
4. Deontological 
(rules, norms, laws) 
This dimension is “the rules of 
the game” of the system 
- Designs, implements and/or 
conforms (more or less drastically) 
to diverse rules 
5. Axiological 
(values) 
Value systems underlie human 
action.  They influence decisions 
and reactions when facing risk 
- Is not insensitive to certain values 
which one can respect or defend if 
they are threatened 
  
Diagram 2:  multidimensional synthesis of the process leading to the emergence of 
doping through autotransfusion 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
	
	
	
RULES 
OBJECTIVES 
VALUES 
FACTS 
KNOWLEDGE 
Search for new 
procedures; old 
procedures 
come back into 
favor 
 
Fine tuning of the 
controls: progress in EPO 
detection capacities 
Laxness of the Spanish 
government regarding 
doping before 2005 
No legal sanction 
against doping 
Undetectable blood 
transfusions 
Lack of 
deterrence of 
sanctions, 
particularly for 
dealers 
1990 anti-doping 
law restricted to 
athletes and barely 
implemented 
Little notice taken 
of indications of a 
return to blood 
doping Suspicions of the 
Fuentes/Saiz network 
barely followed by action 
Opportunities for medical 
business (25,000 to 70,000 
euros per year per cyclist 
under treatment)  
36 
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 3:  multidimensional synthesis of the processes contributing to the regulatory 
difficulties a posteriori 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RULES 
KNOWLEDGE 
OBJECTIVES 
Opportunism of 
teams hiring 
“puertists”  
Barely credible 
autoregulation 
of the actors of 
sports events 
Conceal the scope 
of doping in Spain 
Weak pressure on the 
Spanish “puertists” (official 
support) 
Ethical agreements and 
moral commitments 
scorned 
Untouchable 
status of some 
sport legends 
Defensive 
mobilization of values 
Heterogeneity of 
points of view and 
ambiguities regarding 
the dangerosity of the 
process involved 
Very limited 
No consensus on 
the necessity of 
identifying all 
the athletes 
implicated 
Threats to Dr 
Fuentes  Obstacles to the 
production and 
transmission of data 
Focus on cyclists only 
Avoid harming high level 
sport, Spanish showcase 
Impossibility to 
sanction as long 
as the riders 
are healthy 
Competing and 
contradictory  legal 
referentials 
Multiplicity of actors 
issuing and supposedly 
implementing rules 
Defensive use and 
manipulation of 
the rules 
Long delays in the 
successive procedures 
No basis for sport 
or legal sanctions 
 
Necessity to turn to 
other felonies 
Riders 
untouchable 
Sport movement 
forbidden to use 
files as a basis for 
sanctions 
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